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Introduction
In 2003, one person in China and three in neighboring Vietnam became infected with Avian
Influenza (H5N1). All died. Last year, 95 human
cases with 41 deaths from Avian influenza were
reported to the World Health Organization
(WHO), and already this year, there have been
94 cases with 63 deaths in Africa and Asia including Turkey and Azerbaijan. Although the
total number of cases has been low, and transmission has been primarily from animal to
human, the high mortality rate and lack of effective treatments or vaccines for Avian influenza
(H5N1) have fanned concerns that the virus
could mutate to become transmittable between
humans, and wreak the kind of worldwide devastation caused by the 1918-1919 Spanish
Influenza pandemic - a global outbreak that
caused approximately 50 million deaths worldwide, and created socio-economic and political
havoc.
The historical pattern of pandemic influenza
cycling suggests that it is not a matter of if, but
when, the next pandemic will emerge and some
experts worry that H5N1 or a similar virus will be
responsible. The potential threat of a global
influenza pandemic has triggered efforts to
increase outbreak surveillance, preparedness
and response planning, as well as the research
and development of therapeutic interventions.
In the US many state and local institutions, hospitals, schools, utilities, corporations, communities and families are receiving support and tailored information to assist them in developing
procedures to prepare for widespread influenza
yet, to date, the unique issues of correctional
institutions have largely been ignored.
Currently, over 9 million people are held in penal
institutions throughout the world, with over 2 million in the US.1 Rather than being insular and
isolated, the populations of both jails and prisons are dynamic with inmates frequently entering and leaving these facilities. The fluidity of
movement of individuals between correctional
facilities and their communities can have seri-
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ous public health implications were pandemic
influenza to strike. Within the confined facilities
of a jail or prison it is not difficult to image how
the entry of even a single person, inmate or
staff, incubating highly infectious pandemic
influenza could spark a devastating outbreak akin to the lethal waves of influenza that spread
among the barracks of soldiers in the early
twentieth century.
With so much at stake, and so many variations
in types of correctional facilities, flexibility in
planning for pandemic influenza is critical as
each jail and prison must adapt responses to
their own specific circumstances, while taking
advantage of the strategies that apply to all. In
this paper we consider some of the unique
issues faced by correctional facilities in their
efforts to plan for pandemic preparedness and
response. We examine the physical and social
make-up of the inmate population; access to
medications, including antivirals and vaccines;
surveillance and reporting; access to hospitals
and medical facilities; infection control and containment; and staff absenteeism.
The incarcerated population at risk
Many incarcerated persons may be at relatively
higher risk for influenza infection. According to
the American College of Physicians (2001), the
incarcerated population is disproportionately
made up of members of vulnerable and underserved groups and is primarily male, minority,
and younger adult but with a growing number of
elderly inmates. Many inmates suffer from
immunological and infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C Virus infection, tuberculosis and others.2 Drug resistance is a growing problem (e.g. multi-drug resistant TB, methiContinued on page 3
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Dear Corrections Colleagues,
As winter approaches, the near ubiquity of cold and flu symptoms reminds us all how easily infections may spread from person to person; in correctional medicine, the challenge to prevent an outbreak of communicable disease is that much greater. Close living quarters, community food preparation, and shared cleaning and toiletry facilities put inmates at greater risk for rapid spread of viral
infections. This issue of IDCR focuses on preparing for pandemic flu in a correctional setting, controlling the spread of varicella zoster virus (VZV) infection, and includes the recently updated
MMWR guidelines for adult vaccinations.
In her article focusing on pandemic flu in corrections, Rachel Schwartz introduces key concepts to
help prepare for pandemic flu in a prison environment. Though important for any community, the
advance development of specific plans to deal with a pandemic flu outbreak are crucial to maintaining the viability of a correctional facility, its staff, and its inmate population. The author outlines
elements of preparedness unique to a correctional environment; these include increased surveillance of potential cases at commitment, the designation of specific areas which may serve as isolation and/or quarantine space in the throes of an outbreak, and the need to work closely with security personnel to formulate practical guidelines individualized to each facility. Such plans must be
integrated into each facility's emergency response plan and should be adaptable to other potential
infectious outbreaks (e.g. previous SARS experiences).
Joseph Bick's article updates us on important advances in the control of VZV. Vaccinations are
available to protect against primary varicella and also to booster the immune system to minimize
the development of zoster in those who had been previously infected. Cases of varicella in a correctional facility often incite fear among staff and inmates. Bick argues that an active employee
immunization program including VZV helps minimize the crisis. This illuminates the facet of correctional medicine involved in protecting our staff.
MMWR recently published new guidelines for adult immunizations, including important recommendations especially relevant to inmate populations. The development of the human papillomavirus
(HPV) vaccine has the potential to significantly decrease the cases of cervical cancer seen among
our female inmates. Inmates have higher rates of sexually transmitted infections, including HPV,
than the general population, and therefore will benefit from this vaccine series, which is recommended for women through 26 years of age. Also relevant to incarcerated populations is the new
recommendation of including a pertussis component with tetanus vaccine. Pertussis can be spread
easily in a facility such as a prison, where someone with a chronic cough can be contagious for a
prolonged period of time prior to diagnosis. This vaccine should be encouraged among staff and
inmates.
This issue will hopefully assist in developing key infection control programs in correctional facilities
a pandemic flu plan and an active immunization program. Please contact me at
michael.poshkus@doc.ri.gov with any questions or if you wish to share your individualized plans. I
look forward to your responses.
Sincerely,

David Paar, MD
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PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS...
(continued from page 1)

cillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus), as
are mental illness and a lack of consistent
health care prior to entering and upon
release from the corrections system.3
Scientific and historical evidence indicates
that infectious disease outbreaks in such
closed environments tend to be "explosive
in nature, with high attack rates as well as
significant morbidity and mortality 4," and
that prison overcrowding - a serious problem in many facilities - is a major contributor to disease spread.5 If, as most pandemic planners now posit, 30% of the general
population is likely to contract pandemic
influenza, it may be further assumed that
incarcerated populations will suffer at least
the same rate of infection or higher.
Surveillance and reporting
Successful infectious disease response is
predicated upon effective surveillance and
reporting. In the event of a rapidly spreading airborne viral infection, such as influen-

H5N1 Avian Flu Virus
Source: CDC

za, accurate reporting of cases is essential
to the mounting of appropriate public health
responses. How well institutions such as
correctional facilities, nursing homes, businesses, hospitals and schools will perform
is unclear. There is particular concern that
some jails and prisons are ill-prepared to
quickly recognize and report an emerging
influenza outbreak. In its July 2002 report,
the National Institute of Justice and the
National Commission on Correctional
Health Care (NCCHC) note that of 41 state
departments of corrections surveyed, "less
than half…reported having data on the
number of inmates with chronic diseases
such as diabetes, asthma or hypertension."
Furthermore, "few systems can measure
the prevalence of communicable disease…" - information crucial in tracking the
progress of disease and devising treatment
strategies.
To meet this challenge prisons and jails
must develop and enhance their surveillance capabilities. Essential elements
include the education of medical personnel
in disease recognition and reporting.
Procedures detailing who within the correctional system should be contacted regarding suspected cases (and how this communication should be made) need to be formu-
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lated. Further, it should be made clear who
in the system is responsible for alerting
local and state authorities of suspected or
confirmed cases.
Access to hospital services and care
Most pandemic influenza models assume
that hospitals and other health care facilities
will be ill-equipped to respond to a pandemic. Within a short time of the onset of the
disease in the population, such centers will
be overwhelmed by the influx of patients
and by the high absentee levels among
staff. In fact, Hick, Daniel, and O'Laughlin
note that despite significant medical
advances since the last pandemic (196869), the decrease in inpatient beds,
increased emergency department crowding, and contraction of intensive care unit
bed capacity, staff and overall resources
may lead to a situation in which "many
patients of a modern pandemic may receive
medical care similar to that provided to
patients during the 1918 pandemic." 6,7
At a minimum, hospitals will be forced to
institute altered standards of care, limiting
or halting elective procedures, and resorting to triage systems in which treatment is
given only to those most likely to survive.6
This will be especially important when
shortages of ventilators and other acute
care supplies develop, a likely scenario
given that these are often required in the
treatment of pandemic influenza cases.
These strains on the health care infrastructure will have implications for correctional
facilities. Under such conditions, hospitals
may be unlikely to accept patients from corrections facilities for treatment. Even if hospital transfer is an option, shortages of custody staff stretched thin by increased
inmate hospitalization and illness among
their own ranks would make it extremely difficult to provide the security needed to
make patient transfers possible.
An additional concern is the possibility that
in the event of pandemic influenza, inmates
will be considered a relatively low priority in
so far as allocation of preventative and therapeutic interventions that may be in short
supply. Antivirals and vaccines may be
rationed, and prisoners, despite their
heightened risk for infection, are at risk for
being passed over. Unfortunately, there is
precedent for such discrimination: in light of
a shortage of seasonal influenza vaccine
for the general population, the governor of
one state ordered vaccine supplies used in
correctional facilities to be distributed
instead to the general population, over the
objections of prison authorities.
In order to help ensure that vaccine and
medication supplies are available to
inmate-patients, correctional authorities
need to partner with government officials
and explain to the relevant authorities (and
the general populace) the individual and
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public health justification for providing prisoners access to these medications and vaccines.
Treatment and containment strategies
It is probable that in the setting of an overwhelmed health care system, most corrections authorities will need to assume care
for sick inmates within their facilities. Each
facility must prepare and exercise a plan
that provides for the housing and care of
sick inmates far beyond the present capacity of their infirmaries. The plan will have to
take into account the possibility that quarantine may be necessary, requiring dedicated facilities and training in implementation
for staff. Staff (including health care and
custody) and inmates will also need training
in basic hygiene, infection-containment and
control measures. The use of personal protective equipment (PPE) must be enforced
among staff and inmates (see idcr-o-gram).
Locking down correctional facilities for
security or isolation/quarantine over a long
stretch may not be necessary during a pandemic but in the case of sporadic outbreaks
it is possible public health authorities will
restrict movement into and out of correctional facilities. For example, health care
workers in China and Canada were confined to their hospitals during the SARS outbreak. Some experts have also suggested
that under such conditions, authorities may
wish to retain all inmates until they are
deemed healthy, regardless of release
dates. It may also be necessary to institute
mandatory quarantine of new inmates
before they are introduced into the general
population, or are moved between facilities.
Absenteeism
Recent research into pandemic response
has led to estimates of 40% absenteeism
as standard for populations who grow ill or
stay home to care for others or protect
themselves. In preparation, it will be crucial
to develop some redundancy in staff (ideally at least 3 deep) so that if the warden is
unavailable, a trained designee will be able
to step in and carry out the warden's
responsibilities effectively. In the case of
health care workers, this will require crosstraining. Such plans are more likely to be
successfully implemented during a time of
need if they are outlined and explained to
the staff ahead in advance.
Clearly, some absenteeism is unavoidable,
given that staff will fall ill, as will family
members who require care. The goal must
therefore be to minimize absenteeism
among the well, in part, by providing a safe
working environment with the availability of
PPE, and to encourage the return of those
who have recovered from the disease (i.e.
enforce 100% vaccine coverage to staff).
Annual seasonal influenza vaccination drives among employees will help prepare
Continued on page 4
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(continued from page 3)

staff for vaccination in the case of a pandemic, if a vaccine become available. To
further augment staff numbers, corrections
administrators should also consider contacting retirees and reliable volunteers and
training them to step in when they are needed.
Conclusions
During an influenza pandemic, inmates
may be particularly vulnerable to infection
due to the close quarters in which most
live as well as the relatively high prevalence of co-morbid health conditions.
While intensive efforts to prevent and contain an outbreak in prisons and jails can be
justified as good public health policy, popular opinion during the chaos of a pandemic may threaten this logic and lead to
rationing of scarce resources away from
correctional settings.
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Correctional systems of all sizes need to
consider their current state of preparedness
for pandemic influenza and other similar
catastrophes. It is difficult to fully prepare for
the worst and few, if any, correctional facilities can adequately plan to meet the challenges of a pandemic of influenza without
substantial coordination with local health
authorities. However, by outlining some of
the problems correctional facilities will likely
face during an outbreak we hope to help
administrators of jails and prisons to begin
to consider how they would function during
such a catastrophe.
The specter of pandemic influenza is one
that is almost too horrific to imagine; however, now, on the cusp of winter, is the perfect time for correctional facility health and
custody leaders to assess how well-prepared the facility is to deal with such an outbreak - remembering, it is not a question of
if, but when.
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IDCR-O-GRAM
An Approach to Immediate Response to First Pandemic
Influenza in Corrections Facilities
Initial Case(s) Discovered
Activate
Emergency
Staffing Plan

Activate
Cohorting
Plan

Isolate Patient(s)
Multiple inmate cases may
be placed in the same room
Sick patients should wear
surgical masks to prevent
transmission
Report to local public health
authorities
Determine patients' contacts and place in quarantine unit
Ten days from last exposure
without symptoms

Activate personal protective
equipment
(PPE) distribution and use
procedures See
Right Table

Institute hygiene and infection control measures
Inform all inmates and staff of
status and need for cough
control, hand hygiene, etc.
Make sure necessary supplies are available
Initiate lockdown/
partial lockdown
No external visitors
No new prisoners
No release of prisoners
Communicate steps
being taken in facility to
Media
Inmate families
Staff families

Designate Staff
Medical and
security personnel working
closely with sick
inmates should
be issued full
protective gear
(N95 mask,
gloves, gowns)
and should limit
movements in
and out of the
isolation unit

Institute Staff
Absenteeism
procedures
Sick, stay home
Working well
given extra
support
Recovered sick
return to job

Recommendations for Personal Protective Equipment
During Pandemic Outbreak in Corrections Setting
Masks+

Gowns

Gloves

Goggles/
face shields

Direct patient
contact including
performing
procedures

N-95

Yes

Non-sterile

Yes

Within 3 ft. of
patient no direct
contact

N-95

No

No

No

Patient with
Avian Flu

Surgical

No

No

No

Contact outside 3
feet *

Surgical

No

No

No

+While N-95 masks are somewhat more protective than surgical masks,
they must be carefully fitted, are more expensive, and less comfortable
than surgical masks.
*Current research indicates use of surgical masks outside the immediate
area of sick patient could be helpful in limiting transmission. Masks could
be distributed to inmates and personnel in affected cell-block, but is not
required.
Note: These precautions are specifically recommended for Avian
Influenza but have been indicated for use in other types of Influenza pandemics. These precautions should be taken as part of infection controls
that include proper airborne precautions, hand-washing etiquette, and
decontamination of surfaces exposed to infectious particles. Guidelines on
PPEs are continually updated and are available at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/index.htm
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CASE STUDY - INFECTION CONTROL
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It is 5:00 p.m. on Friday afternoon, and you
are looking forward to a well-deserved
weekend with your family. As you prepare to
leave the facility, you receive a frantic call
from your Director of Nursing. A late bus
has just arrived, and one of the prisoners on
the bus has a vesicular rash. Also on the
bus are six HIV-infected patients, a patient
on high dose prednisone, and a patient who
is status post bone marrow transplant. The
nurse who is doing the intake screening just
learned that she is six weeks pregnant.
You:
A. Call the warden, lock down the facility,
and notify homeland security that you have
just received a case of probable smallpox.
B. Kick yourself forever having gotten
involved in this crazy world of correctional
healthcare.
C. Reassure your DON, and head to reception confident in your ability to differentiate
between the common causes of vesicular
rashes and to implement the appropriate
management plan.

Clinical Features
Varicella zoster virus (VZV) is the cause of
two distinct clinical syndromes: primary
varicella, or chicken pox, and recrudescent
varicella, also referred to as zoster or shingles. Prior to the widespread use of the varicella vaccine, virtually everyone became
infected with VZV, with more than 90% of
cases occurring before the age of fifteen.
Following the licensing of the varicella vaccine in 1995, the number of varicella cases
in the United States has declined by approximately 85%. In addition, hospitalizations for
varicella-related illness have declined by
more than 70%, and deaths attributable to
varicella have decreased significantly.
Most people who become infected with VZV
will be symptomatic, and those who recall a
history of chickenpox can be assumed to be
immune to re-infection. Approximately 80%
of adults will remember having had varicella, and among the 20% who do not recall
having had the disease, serology will
demonstrate prior infection in over 80%.
Once infected with VZV, the incubation period prior to symptoms is 10-21 days. The
most common symptoms of primary varicella are a low-grade fever, malaise, and rash.
The rash classically begins as macules and
papules on the face and trunk, and rapidly
progresses to vesicles, which can involve
the entire body. A hallmark of primary vari-
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VARICELLA

ZOSTER VIRUS

cella is the development of successive
crops of lesions over several days. The
number of vesicles ranges from a few to
more than a thousand, and tend to increase
with
the
age
of
the
patient.
Immunocompromised individuals tend to
have a larger number of lesions, and are
also at increased risk for visceral involvement. Denuded lesions can become secondarily infected with bacteria, and rarely
staphylococcus or group A streptococcus
can cause serious secondary infections.
Another very serious complication of chickenpox is varicella pneumonia, which can
occur in up to 20% of adults who develop
primary varicella. VZV can also involve the
heart, liver, kidneys, and central nervous
system (CNS).
Primary varicella is highly contagious, and
is most commonly transmitted by small
droplet aerosols from the nasopharyngeal
secretions of children in school or daycare
who have active chickenpox. In the correctional setting, visiting children can be a
source of varicella. VZV can also be transmitted from a person with zoster when a
non-immune person comes into direct contact with the lesions of zoster or has exposure to aerosolized virus from clothing or
linen.
Those who have primary varicella are contagious beginning 48 hours before the
development of a rash and continuing until
all lesions have crusted. New lesions will
most commonly continue to appear for several days, and complete crusting generally
occurs within seven to ten days. After resolution of the initial illness, VZV remains dormant in the dorsal root ganglia. Once infected, individuals will harbor VZV for life.
Herpes zoster (shingles) is due to reactivation of VZV from the dorsal nerve root ganglia. Approximately 300,000 cases of zoster
develop in the United States each year. By
the age of 75 years, 30-40% of persons will
have experienced an episode of zoster. The
incidence of zoster is markedly increased in
those who have HIV infection, those receiving corticosteroids or other immunosuppressant therapy, and those who have a
malignancy. Zoster or a history of zoster in
a person who is not elderly or in anyone at
increased risk for HIV infection (such as the
incarcerated) should prompt a recommendation for HIV testing.
Unlike chicken pox, zoster is characterized
by a unilateral distribution of vesicular
lesions in the distribution of a single or several adjacent dermatomes. A vesicular rash
that crosses the midline is extremely unlikely to be due to zoster. Infrequently, a more
disseminated form of zoster can develop.
This variant is more likely to occur in persons who have profound immunosuppresion as in the setting of stem cell transplant.
A prodrome of pain, numbness, or pruritus

(VZV)
can occur for hours to days before the
appearance of lesions. New vesicles typically continue to form for three to five days,
scabbing generally occurs by seven to ten
days, and complete healing may require
two to four weeks. Although any dermatome
can be involved, those most commonly
affected are from the mid-thoracic to the
lower lumbar area. Zoster involving the ophthalmic branch of the trigeminal nerve is
referred to as zoster ophthalmicus, and is
an ophthalmologic emergency. Any involvement of the trigeminal nerve requires urgent
ophthalmologic referral. Ophthalmic zoster
can result in uveitis, keratitis, scleritis,
and/or optic neuritis.
Zoster can lead to bacterial infection or
scarring at the site of the skin lesions.
Careful attention to skin hygiene can
decrease the risk of secondary infection.
Uncommon complications include cutaneous dissemination, pneumonitis hepatitis,
encephalitis, myelitis, motor neuropathies,
and granulomatous CNS vasculitis.
Zoster is commonly accompanied by acute
neuritis and/or postherpetic neuralgia. Both
can be severe, disabling, and refractory to
treatment. The frequency of postherpetic
neuralgia increases in those who develop
zoster at an older age. Pain lasting more
than one month is uncommon in those less
than 30 years old, but is seen in 60-70% of
those over age 60. A common sequela is
Ventral Axial
Line of Arm

Ventral Axial
Line of Leg

Different dermatomes of the body that can be
affected by shingles.
Source: CDC

hyperesthesia. Patients may report that
gusts of wind or the pressure of thin bed
sheets leads to sharp intense pain.

Differential Diagnosis
Prior to the last reported indigenous case of
smallpox in 1977, it was important to
include this virus in the differential diagnosis
of a vesicular rash. An important difference
between the two illnesses is that the rash of
varicella has macules, papules, vesicles,
and scabs in varying degrees of evolution.
In smallpox, all lesions are in the same
stage.
Other illnesses that should be considered in
the differential diagnosis of varicella include
impetigo, disseminated herpes simplex, disseminated herpes zoster, dermatitis herpetiformis, and disseminated coxsackContinued on page 6
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(continued from page 5)

ievirus. These conditions are detailed in
Table I on page 7.

Treatment
The risk for secondary bacterial infection of
the skin during VZV disease can be diminished with good skin hygiene. Fingernails
should be cut short to decrease the likelihood of inoculating the skin with endemic
bacteria such as MRSA. Outside of the correctional setting, daily soaks are commonly
recommended. This is not practical in the
correctional setting, but access to showers
and soap should be facilitated. Antipruritic
medications can provide some relief.
Antiviral treatment of adults who have primary varicella leads to small but statistically
significant improvement in the days of new
lesion formation, the time to onset of cutaneous healing, the time to 100% crusting,
and the total number of lesions. Studies
have yielded conflicting data concerning
whether antiviral therapy decreases the likelihood of chronic pain and the time to cessation of zoster associated pain. To be of benefit, treatment should be initiated as soon as
possible after the development of rash,
preferably within 24 hours.
Regimens that have demonstrated efficacy
in the treatment of acute varicella and zoster
include acyclovir (800 mg by mouth five
times per day), famciclovir (500 mg orally
three times daily) and valacyclovir (1000 mg
by mouth two to three times daily).
Intravenous treatment should be offered to
those who develop visceral disease, those
with disseminated zoster, and immunocompromised persons who develop varicella or
disseminated zoster.
Medications that may provide some relief for
zoster associated pain include nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory medications, tramadol,
narcotics, and medications that interfere
with the transmission of painful impulses
such as tegretol, amitryptiline, and
gabapentin. Several studies have demonstrated a benefit of prednisone treatment
during zoster in terms of accelerating resolution of acute neuritis, return to normal
sleep, return to unaroused sleep, and cessation of analgesic use. The risk, benefit
ratio of prednisone should be weighed carefully and most patients can be managed
without corticosteroids.
The data on
decreasing the prevalence of chronic pain
with corticosteroids is less conclusive.

Prevention
Primary Varicella. A live attenuated varicella
vaccine (Varivax™, Merck and Company,
Inc.) was licensed in 1995 by the Federal
Drug Administration (FDA) for use in healthy
persons 12 months of age or older who have
not had varicella. One dose of the vaccine is
highly immunogenic, leading to the development of protective antibody titers in 95% of
healthy children and 88% of healthy adults.
Mild vaccine associated symptoms (fever,
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rash, and/or local symptoms) occur in 4-8%
of individuals.
Individuals with a history of varicella (i.e.
chickenpox as a child) do not need to
receive the vaccine, as prior infection confers protection against re-infection.
Pregnant women with a history of previous
varicella infection should be considered
immune. Pregnant women without a history
of previous varicella infection are at risk of
infection, which can lead to severe complications of the pregnancy. For this reason,
particular attention must be paid to prevent
non-immune pregnant women from exposure to individuals with active varicella disease.
As preventive use of the VZV vaccine has
become increasingly common, more persons have reached adulthood without having been either infected or vaccinated. In
addition, immunity following vaccination
may wane over time, leaving some adults at
risk for acquiring VZV at a later age. The
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention's Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) has recently
added a recommendation for a second dose
of varicella vaccination. The first dose
should be offered between the ages of 12
and 18 months, and the second between the
ages of 4 and 6 years. In addition, ACIP now
recommends that persons over 13 years old
who do not have a history of varicella infection or of vaccination should receive two
doses of varicella vaccine at an interval of 48 weeks. The ACIP is also recommending
that adolescents and adults who previously
received one dose of the vaccination should
receive a booster, regardless of how long
ago the initial dose was.
Adults who are vaccinated for VZV can
develop a rash within 2 to 6 weeks of receiving the vaccine. The rash can be vesicular,
macular, or papular, and can be localized to
the site of the vaccination or disseminated.
Employees should be educated that they
may develop a rash following vaccination
and instructed to inform employee health
staff if a rash is seen. Employees who
develop a rash are potentially contagious to
non-immune individuals, and should be
medically furloughed until the rash resolves.
Lesions will typically heal in 2 to 3 days.

Zoster
Recently, a trial was performed to determine
if vaccination of VZV infected adults would
decrease the incidence of zoster. Over
37,000 volunteers >60 years old participated
in this study and were followed up for an
average of three years. Those who were
vaccinated had a 52.3% decrease in the
incidence of zoster. Those who were vaccinated and developed zoster had a 61.1%
decrease in the incidence post herpetic neuralgia. In May of 2006 the FDA approved the
use of this live attenuated varicella vaccine
(Zostavax™, Merck and Company, Inc.), a
stronger version of the chickenpox vaccine,
for the prevention of zoster in people > 60
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years of age who have previously been
infected with VZV. The vaccine is given as a
single injection under the skin, preferably in
the upper arm.
Both Varivax and Zostavax are contraindicated in persons with a history of anaphylactic or anaphylactoid reaction to gelatin,
neomycin, or any other component of the
vaccine, a history of primary or acquired
immunodeficiency
states
including
leukemia, lymphomas, or other malignant
neoplasms affecting the bone marrow or
lymphatic system. They are also contraindicated in persons with AIDS or other clinical
manifestations of infection with human
immunodeficiency viruses, persons on
immunosuppressive therapy including highdose corticosteroids, and in women who are
or may be pregnant.

Infection Control
Transmission of varicella from health care
workers to patients is a well-recognized phenomenon that can have devastating consequences. Providing varicella vaccination to
non-immune employees can decrease the
likelihood of transmission in either direction
between
staff
and
inmate/patients.
Vaccination is especially important for
employees who are in contact with those
inmate/patients who are at greatest risk for
varicella-related
complications.
This
includes pregnant inmates and those who
are immunocompromised (for example,
those who are HIV-infected).
Another benefit of an active varicella vaccination program is that it simplifies the
required response to the diagnosis of varicella within the facility. Employees who are
known to be immune to VZV (either naturally or via vaccination) will not be subject to
medical furlough following possible exposure episodes.
Because varicella is spread through the air,
it is essential to isolate those who have contagious VZV disease. Inmate-patients with
active VZV should be placed in a private
room that has negative air pressure relative
to the hallway and kept there until all vesicular lesions have dried. Employees who
have active VZV should be medically furloughed for a similar period of time.
If negative pressure rooms are not available, it may be acceptable to confine the
inmate-patient in a cell or dormitory with
inmates who are known to immune by virtue
of having had VZV in the past. Employees
who are not known to be immune should not
participate in the care of persons who have
VZV unless wearing a respirator.
A contact investigation should be performed
to identify non-immune persons who may
have shared the air with the person who has
active varicella. Because of the highly
immunogenic nature of the vaccine, testing
to demonstrate immunity is not recommended among those who have been vaccinated.
Continued on page 7
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If an exposed person does not recall a
history of vaccination or active VZV disease, stat serology (results within 72 hours)
should be obtained. Persons who are VZV
IgG negative can be considered to be nonimmune. Exposed susceptible inmatepatients should be cohorted and medically
confined to a housing unit beginning 10
days after exposure and ending 21 days
after exposure. Exposed susceptible staff
should be medically furloughed during the
same time frame.

Post Exposure Prophylaxis
Non-immune persons who have been
exposed to varicella and who are considered to be at high risk for severe disease
and complications should be offered varicella zoster immunoglobulin. High risk nonimmune adults include pregnant women and
those who are immunocompromised (HIV
infected, recipients of organ transplants,
those receiving immunosuppressive agents,
etc). Varicella zoster immunoglobulin should
be administered as soon as possible, within
96 hours of exposure. Non-immune adults
should also be vaccinated for varicella
unless contraindicated (HIV infection with
CD-4 counts < 200 or 15%). Varicella vaccine should not be given until at least five
months after varicella immunoglobulin.
In 2004, the only U.S. licensed manufacturer of VZIG discontinued production. In 2006,
an investigational VZIG product, VariZIG™
(Cangene Corporation, Winnipeg, Canada)
became available under an investigational
new drug application (IND). Investigational
VariZIG™ is distributed by FFF Enterprises
(Temecula, California; 24-hour telephone,
800-843-7477).

Conclusion
5:16 p.m.
You take a deep breath, and enter the bus
screening area. Since you had chickenpox
as a child, you know that you do not need to
worry about "catching" it again. The triage
nurse is in tears, and her union rep is helping her fill out a stress claim.
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While evaluating the 20 year-old inmate who
has a rash, you learn that two weeks ago his
girlfriend and their two year-old child visited
him in the county jail. He recalls that the
child had a fever, and was not her usual
playful self. Neither he nor his girlfriend has
vaccinated the child, because they believe
that immunizations are dangerous. You
examine the patient and find that he has
over 100 scattered skin lesions on his face,
chest, back, and arms. The lesions include
macules, papules, vesicles, pustules, and
scabs. He has a temperature of 101.6,
malaise, anorexia, and pruritus. He does not
recall having had chickenpox as a child. You
diagnosis him with primary varicella, and
have him separated from the rest of those
who need evaluation. You ask the Nursing
Director to contact your local referral hospital and arrange for a negative pressure respiratory isolation room. You also ask her to
ensure that those assigned to transport the
patient have all had chicken pox.
5:31 p.m.
You turn your attention to the bus screening
nurse. Your pulse quickens when she tells
you that she does not remember having had
chicken pox. You know that chickenpox is
one diagnosis for which the sensitivity and
specificity of a mother's history is superb,
and so you ask the nurse to call her mom.
You resume the investigation of those who
traveled on the bus with your chickenpox
patient.
5:42 p.m.
There are a total of 12 new arrivals, including the 6 patients who are known to be HIV
infected, one who is receiving 60 mg per day
of prednisone for some type of kidney disorder, and one who is 18 months post stem
cell transplant for ALL. You are informed that
all the patients' charts were mistakenly left at
the last institution. The inmates are working
together on some paperwork; one of them
asks you if you know how to spell "deliberate indifference".
Ten of the inmate-patients recall having had
chicken pox as a child. You advise them that
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they are immune, have no risk of being reinfected, and that they do not need any special treatment related to this exposure. You
inform custody that these ten inmates can
be housed without regard to this exposure.
Two of the patients do not recall a history of
chickenpox; one is HIV infected and the
other is your stem cell transplant patient.
You order a stat blood draw for varicella
zoster serology (IgG) to be obtained from
both of these patients. You authorize overtime for the phlebotomist to personally drop
the specimens off at the local reference lab
that evening, with instructions that you need
results back no later than Monday afternoon. You place a medical hold on these two
patients, and inform custody that although
these patients are not contagious and do not
need special housing, they must not leave
the institution until they have been evaluated further.
6:02 p.m.
Returning to the reception nurse, you are
immensely relieved to learn that her mother
clearly recalls nursing her through chickenpox when your employee was four years
old. You reassure the nurse that there is no
risk to her or her unborn baby from this
exposure, write her a brief note, and suggest that she follow-up with her physician for
good measure.
6:15 p.m.
You stroll confidently to the parking lot, hoping to salvage some of the evening with your
family. As you pull out of the parking lot, you
answer a new page from the watch commander. She informs you that one of her
sergeants has determined that an inmate
has scabies, has quarantined the man's 300
man dorm, and is demanding that all 300
inmates be treated immediately with DDT…

Go to www.AAHIVM.org to learn about membership, continuing education and the new
partnership with IDCR

Table I: Differential diagnosis of primary varicella
Etiology

Comments

Primary varicella

Characteristic skin rash with successive crops of macules, papules, vesicles, pustules, and scabs. Lowgrade fever, malaise, anorexia, pruritus. Treatment: supportive, acyclovir derivatives.

Impetigo

Can be associated with small vesicles. Usually secondary to staphylococcus or group A beta-hemolytic streptococci. Often follows superficial skin break or abrasion. Can be associated with cellulitis or bacteremia. Gram stain and culture of unroofed lesions may demonstrate the bacterial etiology. Treatment:
antibacterial agents.

Disseminated herpes simplex

Uncommon. Usually in setting of skin condition such as eczema or atopic dermatitis. Diagnosis can be
made clinically or by culture of unroofed lesion. Treatment: acyclovir derivatives.

Disseminated herpes zoster

May be seen in those with lymphoproliferative disorders. Rarely in setting of HIV. Treatment: acyclovir
derivatives.

Disseminated coxsackievirus

Commonly morbilloform with a hemorrhagic component. Occurs during enterovirus season
(summer/fall). Lesions appear on palms, soles, and pharynx. Treatment: supportive.

Dermatitis herpetiformis

Chronic, pruritic papulovesicular lesions involving extensor surfaces of elbows, knees,
buttocks, back, scalp. Diagnosis assisted by biopsy. Treatment: dapsone, gluten
restriction.

October/November 2006

Vol. 9, Issue 10

8

visit IDCR online at www.IDCRonline.org

VACINE 101
Recommended Adult Immunization Schedule, by Vaccine and Age Group
Vaccine

Age Group

19 - 49 years

>65 years

50-64 years

Tetanus, diptheria, pertussis (Td/Tdap)
Measles, mumps, rubella
Varicella
Human Papilloma Virus (HPV)
Influenza
Pneumococcal (polysaccharide)
Hepatitis A
Hepatitis B
Meningococcal
For all people in this category who meet the age requirements and who lack evidence of
immunity (i.e. lack prior vacine documentation or have no evidence of prior infection)

Recommended if some risk factor is identified (i.e. based
on occupational, medical, lifestyle, or other indication)

Recommended Adult Immunization Schedule, by Vaccine and Medical and Other Indications
Vaccine

Indication

Pregnancy

Diabetes, heart disease, chronic
pulmonary disease, chronic
liver disease

HIV Infection

Heath Care Workers

Recommended if some other risk factor is present
(i.e. based on occupational, medical, lifestyle, or
other indications)

Contraindicated

Tetanus, diptheria, pertussis (Td/Tdap)

Measles, mumps, rubella
Varicella
Human Papilloma Virus (HPV)
Influenza
Pneumococcal (polysaccharide)
Hepatitis A
Hepatitis B
Meningococcal
For all persons in this category who meet the age requirements
and who lack evidence of immunity (i.e. lack of documentation
of vaccination or have no evidence of prior infection)

Modified from CDC. Recommended Adult Immunization Schedule- United States, October 2007-September 2007. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2006;55(40):Q1-Q4.
For further information see the CDC's Recommended Adult Immunization Schedule- United States, October 2007-September 2007 available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5540-Immunizationa1.htm
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SAVE THE
DATES
19th Annual Association of Nurses in
AIDS Care
Scaling the Heights of HIV/AIDS Nursing
October 26-29, 2006
Las Vegas, NV
Visit:: http://www.anacnet.org/conf_natlconf.php
Infectious Disease in Corrections
Report (IDCR) Symposium
"Managing Infectious Disease:
An Expert Panel"
Pre-conference before the NCCHC
Conference
Saturday Afternoon, October 28, 2006
CME credits available
Hyatt Regency Hotel Atlanta, GA
Visit:: http://www.ncchc.org/education
/national2006/atlanta.html
57th Annual Meeting of the American
Association for the Study of Liver
Diseases
October 27-31, 2006
John B. Hynes Convention Center
Boston, MA
Visit:: https://www.aasld.org/eweb/
DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=06_Liver
meeting
National Commission on Correctional
Health Care (NCCHC) Conference
October 28-November 1, 2006
Hyatt Regency Hotel Atlanta, GA
Visit:: http://www.ncchc.org/education
/national2006/atlanta.html
134th Annual American Public Health
Association (APHA) Meeting and
Exposition
November 4-8, 2006
Boston, MA
Visit:: http://www.apha.org/meetings/
6th National Harm Reduction
Conference
November 8-12, 2006
Oakland, CA
Visit:: http://www.harmreduction.org
/6national/
University of Texas Medical Branch
(UTMB) HIV Mini-Fellowship
November 13-15, 2006
Moody Gardens Hotel and
Convention Center
Galveston, TX
$50.00 Registration Fee
CME and CNE credits available
Contact: Victoria Korschgen
E-mail: vikorsch@utmb.edu
Phone: (409)747-2768
14th Conference on Retroviruses and
Opportunistic Infections
February 25-28th, 2007
Los Angeles, CA
Visit:: http://www.retroconference.org/
2007/
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An HIV/STD Risk Reduction Intervention for Male
Prison Releasees: A glass two-thirds full.
Many correctional facilities provide HIV/STD risk reduction counseling to inmates but few, if any, extend such
interventions beyond release -when releasees have the
greatest opportunity to engage in the very behaviors
they are being trained not to do. Project START, a multisite trial funded by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), compared a single session prerelease HIV/STD risk reduction counseling intervention
with a pre-release and post-release series of sessions
focusing not only on risk behaviors but also on community re-entry needs. The single session intervention
was conducted two weeks prior to release and the
multi-session intervention consisted of two pre-release
sessions plus four sessions conducted 1, 3, 6 and 12
weeks after release. Both employ techniques of motivational interviewing, prevention case management
and harm reduction. Participants were incarcerated
men age 18 to 29 years, housed at state prisons in
California, Mississippi, Rhode Island or Wisconsin and
expected to be released to an unrestricted environment
within 14 to 60 days of study entry.
A total of 522 men were enrolled and released. Half
were Black, non-Hispanic, over 90% were single and
unprotected sex in the three months prior to incarceration prior to incarceration was reported by 87.6%. Only
11 men reported sex with a man prior to incarceration
and 2 men were known to be HIV-infected. Two thirds
(67%) of those randomized to the multi-session intervention received five or more of the sessions.
There were no differences in reported risk behaviors
between the study arms at weeks 1 and 12 postrelease. At week 24, statistically significant differences
were observed in reported rates of unprotected vaginal
or anal sex during the most recent encounter and with
any partner favoring the multi-session intervention. Of
the men assigned this intervention, 68% reported these
risk behaviors compared to 78% of those assigned to
the single-session arm (odds ratio=0.40; 95% CI=0.18,
0.88). Interestingly, the multi-session intervention had
the greatest effect at reducing reported unprotected
sex with a main sex partner (someone the participant
felt an emotional attachment or commitment to). In
contrast, the intervention had no significant effect on
risk behavior with non-main partners. Re-incarceration
was common with 44% returning to prison or jail by six
months. At week 12 but not 24, the multi-session group
had significantly higher re-incarceration rates.
These results demonstrate the relative effectiveness of
a risk reduction intervention that spans the periods of
incarceration and release. Yet, they also highlight the

difficulty of positively modifying behavior in this setting
as 68% of those in the 'successful' arm of the study
reported unprotected sex. Further, all behaviors were
self-reported and it is conceivable that those receiving
the more intensive intervention may have felt a greater
need to provide socially desirable responses - unfortunately, biological specimens to test for STDs were not
included in the overall study protocol. Nonetheless, this
is an important study, lessons from which can be
applied to the design of existing or planned risk reduction programs for prison/jail releasees, as well as future
research investigations.
Relative Efficacy of a Multisession Sexual RiskReduction Intervention for Young Men in 4 States.
Wolitski RJ et al. American Journal of Public Health.
2006;96(10):1854-61.
US HIV Treatment Guidelines Updated
A US Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) panel on October 10th announced important
revisions to the department's Guidelines for the Use of
Antiretroviral Agents in HIV-1-Infected Adults and
Adolescents. Reflecting the findings of several from
recently reported antiretroviral clinical trials, the guidelines have expanded the "preferred" options for initial
treatment of HIV infection by adding the ritonavir
(Norvir) boosted protease inhibitors (PI) atazanavir
(Reyataz) and fosamprenavir (Lexiva) to lopinavir/ritonavir (Kaletra) and efavirenz (Sustiva) as favored regimen anchors. These drugs are to be used with duel
nucleoside reverse transcriptase (NRTI) combinations
and the guidelines now list both tenofovir/emtricitabine
(Truvada) and zidovudine/lamivudine (Combivir) as the
only preferred companion NRTIs (see table below).
Several alternative options, considered inferior by the
panel, are listed as they may be preferable in some circumstances. In general, these revisions move these
guidelines closer to those issued by the International
AIDS Society-USA (http://www.iasusa.org/pub/), which
tend to recommened classes of antiretrovirals rather
than specific antiretroviral agents to first-line therapy.
In addition to the revisions to the recommended HIV
therapies for treatment-naive patients, the guidelines
have added information regarding the use of darunavir
(Prezista) and tipranavir (Aptivus) and information on
expanded access to the investigational medications
TMC-125, a non-nucleoside reverse transciptase
inhibitor (NNRTI) and MK-0518, an inhibitor of the HIV
integrase.
The US Department of Health and Human Services.
October 2006. Available at http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/.

RESOURCES
CDC's Provisional ACIP Recommendations for
Prevention of Varicella
www.cdc.gov/nip/vaccine/varicella/varicella_acip_recs_prov_j
une_2006.pd

Bureau of Justice Assistance- Preparing the Justice
System for a Pandemic of Influenza and Other Public
Health Emergencies
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/pandemic_main.html

U.S. Government Avian and Pandemic Flu Information
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/

2006 Recommendations of the International AIDS
Society-USA Panel Treatment for Adult HIV Infection.
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/296/7/827

CDC-Pandemic Influenza Information for Health
Professionals
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/healthprofessional.htm
World Health Organization- Epidemic and Pandemic Alert
and Response
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/index.html
National Institute of Corrections- Pandemic
Preparedness
http://nicic.org/WebTopic_450.htm

CDC's Revised Recommendations for HIV Testing of
Adults, Adolescents, and Pregnant Women in HealthCare Settings
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5514a1.htm
The latest in virology-related CME
www.virologycme.com
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CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION CREDIT

This activity has been planned and implemented in accordance with the Essential Areas and Policies of the Accreditation Council for continuing Medical Education through the joint sponsorship of Medical Education Collaborative, Inc. (MEC) and IDCR. MEC is accredited by the
ACCME to provide continuing medical education for physicians.
Medical Education Collaborative designates this educational activity for a maximum of 1.5 AMA PRA Category 1 Credit(s)™. Physicians should
only claim credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity. Statements of credit will be mailed within 6 to 8 weeks following the program.
Objectives:
The learner will be able to describe the clinical presentations of varicella zoster (VZV).
The learner will be able to cite major considerations in preparing for pandemic influenza in correctional facilities.
The learner will be able to list major modifications to the US Department of Health and Human Services HIV treatment guidelines.
1.

Differences between varicella (zoster) and variola (small
pox) include which of the following:
A. Varicella has macules, papules, vesicles and scabs in varying
degrees of evolution.
B. Variola lesions are typically all in the same stage..
C. The last case of variola was reported in 1977 while varicella is
common.
D. All of the above.

2.

All of the following statements regarding post-exposure prophylaxis
for pregnant health care worked exposed to varicella zoster are cor
rect EXCEPT:
A. If she had chickenpox as a child she should not receive postexposure prophylaxis.
B. If non-immune, she should ideally receive varicella zoster
immunoglobulin (VZIG) and then at least five months later the
varicella vaccine.
C. If she is non-immune and wore gloves when bandaging the
source patient's zoster lesions, she is at no risk of infection.
D. If non-immune, she needs to be furloughed beginning 10 days
after exposure and ending 21 days after exposure.

3.

Revisions announced in October 2006 to the Department of Health

and Human Services guidelines for initial treatment of HIV infection
include which of the following?
A. Ritonavir boosted-fos-amprenavir and -atazanavir have been
added to the preferred regimens list.
B. Both tenovoir/emtricitabine or zidovudine/lamivudine are the
only preferred NRTI combinations.
C. Both efavirenz and lopinavir/ritonavir continue to be listed as
preferred agents.
D. All the above.
4.

Which of the following are appropriate responses to an outbreak of
pandemic influenza in a correctional facility:
A. Isolate the patients with infection
B. Designate staff to handle sick inmates and distribute personal
protective equipment
C. Determine contacts of infected patients and place in quaran
tine
D. Communicate steps being taken to control the outbreak to
media and families of staff and inmates
E. All the above.

5.

Only fitted N-95 masks and not fitted standard surgical masks are
protective against infection with influenza virus (TRUE or FALSE)?
TRUE

or

FALSE

In order to receive credit, participants must score at least a 70% on the post test and submit it along with the credit
application and evaluation form to the address/fax number indicated. Statements of credit will be mailed within 6-8 weeks
following the program.
Instructions:

• Applications for Credit will be accepted until
November 30, 2007.

• Late applications will not be accepted.
• Please anticipate 6-8 weeks to recieve your certificate.
Please print clearly as illegible applications will result in a delay.

Name:

_________________________________________________ Profession: __________________________________

License #: ___________________________________ State of License: __________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________________________________________________________
City: ________________________ State: ________ Zip: ________________________ Telephone: ___________________
Please Check which credit you are requesting

___ ACCME or

___ Non Physicians

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I certify that I participated in IDCR monograph - Oct/Nov 2006 Issue

Please Submit Completed Application to:

Please fill in the number of actual hours that you attended this activity.

Medical Education Collaborative
651 Corporate Circle, Suite 104, Golden CO 80401
Phone: 303-420-3252 FAX: 303-420-3259
For questions regarding the accreditation of this activity, please call
(303)420-3252

Date of participation: ______________________
Number of Hours (max. 1.5): ___________________
Signature: _________________________________________________
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COURSE EVALUATION
I. Please evaluate this educational activity by checking the appropriate box:
Activity Evaluation

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Fair

Faculty
Content
How well did this activity avoid commercial bias and present content that
was fair and balanced?
What is the likelihood you will
change the way you practice based
on what you learned in this activity?
Overall, how would you rate
this activity?

II. Course Objectives
Were the following overall course objectives met? At the conclusion of this presentation, are you able to:

•
•

The learner will be able to describe the clinical presentations of varicella zoster (VZV).

YES

NO

SOMEWHAT

The learner will be able to cite major considerations in preparing for pandemic

YES

NO

SOMEWHAT

YES

NO

SOMEWHAT

influenza in correctional facilities.

•

The learner will be able to list major modifications to the US Department of Health.
and Human Services HIV treatment guidelines

III. Additional Questions
a. Suggested topics and/or speakers you would like for future activities.

b. Additional Comments

Poor

